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Peter L. Lindseth*

RECONCILING WITH THE PAST:
JOHN WILLIS AND THE QUESTION OFJUDICIAL

REVIEW IN INTER-WAR AND POST-WAR ENGLAND'

I Introduction:The 'problem of reconciling'
John Willis's 1933 classic, The ParliamentaryPowers of the English Government
Departments,is essential reading to any historian interested in the debates
over legislative delegation and administrative justice in inter-war England.' The book's immediate purpose was to respond to the assertions
made by Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice of England, in his notorious polemic, The New Despotism, published in 1929.2 Hewart argued, very
much in a Diceyan vein, that the emergent administrative state was a
perversion of the most venerable principles of the English constitution,
notably parliamentary sovereignty and the 'Rule of Law' as enforced by
the ordinary common law courts. Hewart asserted that, particularly
during and after World War I, Parliament was using its undisputed
sovereignty to make wholesale shifts of legislative authority outside the
parliamentary realm and then, through a variety of statutory mechanisms,
to deprive the ordinary courts of their rightful jurisdiction over the lawful
exercise of that authority. The effect was to undermine the rule of law
that had been a cornerstone of the English constitution since the
seventeenth century.
In ParliamentaryPowers, Willis counters that the administrative state in
England has a historical pedigree and underlying normative justification
of its own, one very different from the Diceyan constitutionalism of
Hewart. Administrative structures did not suddenly emerge during World
War I or after; rather, they were the product of '[a] long period of
imperceptible growth' in the nineteenth century, which was followed in
the early twentieth century by 'a quickening to meet the needs of the new
Social State' and then by 'a sudden flowering during the War, and after
the War the full fruition.... '3 The method that Parliament 'invariably
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
t I want to thank all the participants of the Willis Conference at the University of Toronto
Faculty of Law for two days of excellent discussion about the modern administrative
state - its past, present, and future. It was a worthy tribute toJohn Willis.
1 John Willis, The ParliamentaryPowers of English Government Departments (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1933) [ParliamentaryPowers].
2 Lord Hewart of Bury, The New Despotism (London: Ernest Benn, 1929).
3 Willis, ParliamentaryPowers at 5. The definitive modern discussion of this history is to be
found in H.W. Arthurs, Without the Law' AdministrativeJustice and Legal Pluralism in
(2005), 55 UNIVERSirY OF TORONTO IAWJOURNAL
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followed' in delegating legislative and adjudicative powers to the government departments was, according to Willis, functionalist: Parliament
viewed the task of apportioning power as 'neither one of law nor of
formal logic, but of expediency.' 4 Parliament assigned authority 'to the
body which experience has shown best fitted to perform the work' in
question.5 Little or no regard was given to whether this allocation of
authority transgressed traditional constitutional boundaries between
legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
In analysing the modern administrative state from a functionalist
perspective, the young Willis associated himself with a broader scholarly
movement in inter-war England (whose leaders included Harold Laski,
William Robson, and Ivor Jennings) that had assembled to counter
attacks on administrative governance from the bench. 6 Functionalists set
out to explain and justify the modern administrative state to a sometimes
sceptical English public, while also noting that the public's demands for
greater state intervention had given rise to the functionalist expansion of
administrative structures in the first place. 7 The appearance of Parliamentary Powerssimply marked the entry of a new and vigorous voice into this
highly charged legal-political discussion. However, soon after the book
appeared, Willis was (as Michael Taggart so nicely puts it in his contribution to this volume) 'lost to England.' 8 Following the two-year research
stint at Harvard during which he completed ParliamentaryPowers (under
the supervision of Felix Frankfurter), a variety of circumstances took
Willis to Canada and kept him there for the rest of his life. Canadian
public law scholarship was, of course, all the richer for it (as is fittingly
commemorated by this volume and the conference that gave rise to it).

4
5
6

7

8

Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), specifically at
c. 4 ('The NewAdministrative Technology: Necessity, Invention, and Legal Centralism')
and c. 5 ('The Emergence of Administrative Law: The New Pluralism').
See John Willis, 'Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the
Conceptual, and the Functional' (1935) 1 U.T.L.J. 53 at 75 ['Three Approaches'].
Ibid.
Martin Loughlin superbly analyzes this functionalist style of legal analysis, as well as its
intellectual-historical underpinnings, in his Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992) at 165-73.
The report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers captures this position: 'The truth
is that if Parliament were not willing to delegate law-making power, Parliament would
be unable to pass the kind and quantity of legislation which modem public opinion
requires.' Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,Cmd. 4060 (London: HMSO, 1932)
at 23. This statement could have applied equally well to the French and German
parliaments of the same period. See generally Peter L. Lindseth, 'The Paradox of
Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and
France, 1920s-1950s' (2004) 113 Yale LJ. 1341 ['Paradox'].
Michael Taggart, 'From "Parliamentary Powers" to Privatization: The Chequered
History of Delegated Legislation in the Twentieth Century' (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 575 at
593.
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But as Martin Loughlin remarked at the conference, it is impossible to
understand Willis without recognizing that he remained, first and
foremost, 'an Englishman' throughout his life. Willis may have been 'lost
to England' by his move to Canada, but England was certainly not lost to
Willis, at least not in a scholarly sense. His writings in Canada reflect an
abiding interest in English developments; 9 indeed, Willis's repeated
reference to English cases, statutes, committee reports, and scholarship
suggests that England continued to serve as his analytical baseline for
examining the interaction of administrative governance and parliamentary democracy more generally, whether in Canada or elsewhere in the
Commonwealth.
The debates in inter-war England engendered by The New Despotism,
followed by the issuance of the report of the Committee on Ministers'
Powers of 1932 (which was formed specifically in response to Hewart's
attack) ,'o would leave their mark on Willis's outlook for the remainder of
his career. One need only look at his closing salvo in 'Lawyers' Values
and Civil Servants' Values,' directed at the McRuer Report, in 1968: there
Willis admits that his was an 'ill-tempered comment, reminiscent of the
less illuminating disputes of the thirties."' The McRuer Report was, from
Willis's perspective, the ghost of The New Despotism raising its ugly head
once again, albeit in a somewhat more muted, Canadian form. He
explains (if not necessarily excusing himself- he probably felt little need
for excuse) that his ill temper was 'brought on by a recommendation
characteristic of the "establishment side" in the thirties." 2 Reflecting on
McRuer's call for expanded judicial review of administrative action in
Ontario, Willis asserts - somewhat sarcastically - that 'the Commission
mightjust as well go the whole hog and recommend that all the deciding
authorities of whatever nature be brought within the ordinary court
9 In addition to 'Three Approaches,' supra note 4, see, e.g.,John Willis, 'Delegation of
Legislative and Judicial Powers to Administrative Bodies: A Study of the Report of the
Committee on Ministers' Powers' (1932) 18 Iowa L.Rev. 150 ['Delegation'] ;John Willis,
Book Review of Cabinet Government by W. Ivor Jennings (1937) 15 Can.Bar Rev. 579
[Review of Jennings, Cabinet Government]; John Willis, 'Statutory Interpretation in a
Nutshell' (1938) 16 Can.Bar Rev. 1 ['Nutshell'];John Willis, Book Review of Freedom
Under the Law by Sir Alfred Denning (1949) 8 U.T.L.J. 414 [Review .of Denning,
Freedom];JohnWillis, 'The Administrator asJudge - The Citizen's Right to an Impartial
Tribunal' (1957) 5 U.B.C.Leg. Notes 427 ['Administrator as Judge']; John Willis,
'Administrative Decision and the Law: The Canadian Implications ofthe Franks Report'
(1959) 13 U.TL.J. 45 ['Canadian Implications']; John Willis, 'The McRuer Report:
Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values' (1968) 18 U.T.L.J. 351 ['Lawyers' Values'];
and John Willis, 'Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect' (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 225
['Retrospect'].
10 Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,supra note 7.
11 Willis, 'Lawyers' Values,' supra note 9 at 360.
12 Ibid.
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system.' 13 All this, of course, would negate the very purpose of delegation
in the first place -' [e]xpertise, avoidance of delay, reduction of expense" 4
- but this was the slippery slope that Willis believed Ontario administrative law threatened to descend if the McRuer recommendations were
followed.
The irony is that, as David Mullan shows in his contribution to this
volume, there was in fact a good deal of common ground between Willis
and the McRuer Report on numerous critical points. 15 This common
ground, however, is not my principal concern here. Rather, I am more
interested in how Willis's perspective on judicial review in the modern
administrative state - Canadian or otherwise - reflected an attachment to
the battle lines first traced in England in the 1920s and 1930s and then
carried over into the post-war decades. This preoccupation with old
debates gave Willis's subsequent work a sometimes anachronistic tone, as
he himself admitted in 'Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect' in
1974. There he recognized that he had always remained 'one of those
belligerent academics of the thirties' who was ever ready to challenge any
'regression ... to the belligerent anti-bureaucratic lawyers' attitudes of
those days.' 1 6 (Apparently there was plenty of belligerence to go around
then.)
Although Willis's ire was usually directed at the holders of these 'antibureaucratic' attitudes (along with their 'theological' approach to
administrative law),' 7 his real concern was arguably with a more elusive
opponent. He referred to this adversary as the 'feeling of the average
individual citizen which, I think, lies at the root of the constitutional
principle known as the "Rule of Law."'' 8 Willis puzzled throughout his
career over the way in which popular opinion persistently and, in his
view, uncritically equated the rule of law with judicial review. He saw this
linkage as perhaps the greatest obstacle to the realization of his ideal
system of discretionary control, in which policies made by civil servants
would be, to the broadest extent possible, insulated from oversight by the
ordinary courts. In 1937 Willis spoke of legal-cultural attachments of this
kind as among the 'unrealities which provide not only a living for a large
and respectable profession but articles of faith for the whole of AngloAmerican society and must, accordingly, rank as a reality by prescription,
and so, alas, at present ineradicable." 9 And nearly four decades later he
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 David J. Mullan, 'Willis v. McRuer: A Long-Overdue Replay with the Possibility of a
Penalty Shoot-Out' (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 535.
16 Willis, 'Retrospect,' supra note 9 at 234.
17 Ibid. at 227-9.
18 Willis, 'Administrator asJudge,' supra note 9 at 428.
19 Willis, Review ofJennings, Cabinet Government, supra note 9 at 581.
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lamented that so long as 'most people seem to think' that an ordinary
court is '[w] here you get 'justice" and [that] all you get from an administrative tribunal is "second-rate justice" ..., no amount of patient argument
by "pointy-headed perfessers" [sic] will confine judicial review to ... its
correct limits.'2°
Remarks like these reflect Willis's persistent frustration with the role
of judicial review in the administrative state. On the one hand, policymaking structures had consistently moved in a direction Willis applauded
(responding, as they were, to the 'functional' demands for effective
regulation and state intervention in a complex industrial society). On the
other hand, the evolution of these structures was continually impeded by
historical conceptions of legitimacy that Willis either lamented (witness
his constant attacks on the 'eighteenth-century constitution' that gripped
the minds of lawyers and judges 'steeped in the common law') 21 or
accepted grudgingly (as when he acknowledged that 'there is much good
to be said' of 'the currency of constitutional
belief like the "separation of
22
powers" or the "rule of law"').
These attachments to conceptions of legitimacy inherited from the
past were responsible, in Willis's estimation, for the misguided focus of
English administrative law on 'the problem of reconciling,' as he called
it.2 3 This term refers to the adjustments needed both in structures of
governance and in public law so that, on the one hand, effective state
intervention could proceed but, on the other, it could still be understood
as 'constitutional' and 'democratic' in a historically recognizable sense.
This quest for reconciliation in turn led, in Willis's view, to an unnecessary emphasis in administrative law on burdensome 'controls' and
'safeguards' - most importantly, judicial review - something that Willis
critiqued throughout his career, from his analysis of the Report of the
Committee on Ministers' Powers in 193224 to his 'irritated dissent' from
the Report of the McRuer Commission in 1968.25
This article views Willis's discomfort with the 'problem of reconciling'
as itself deeply problematic. His disparaging attitude towards the place of
judicial review in the administrative state was an outgrowth of a limited
and one-sided conception of historical change that focused on structural
evolution while, in effect, dismissing its cultural dimension except as a
force of obstruction and resistance. Willis rejected any attempt at 'reconciling' as a fundamentally misguided effort at 'seeing likeness in unlike
20
21
22
23
24

Willis, 'Retrospect,' supra note 9 at 244.
Willis, 'Lawyers' Values,' supra note 9 at 353.
Willis, 'Three Approaches,' supra note 4 at 70.
Ibid.
Willis, 'Delegation,' supra note 9, critiquing Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,
supra note 7.
25 Willis, 'Lawyers' Values,' supra note 9 at 351.
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things. 26 In fact, 'seeing likeness in unlike things' is an inescapable fact
of life. 27 Historical change is not simply a function of shifts in economic
or legal structures; rather, it also depends on how these shifts are 'experienced in social and cultural life,' to borrow a phrase from E.P.
Thompson. 28 Willis's long career as an active scholar - roughly from the
1930s to the late 1960s and early 1970s - spanned a period of intense
historical dialectic in English administrative law, in which functionally
evolving structures of governance were necessarily 'experienced' in relation to historically rooted ideas and values of legitimate constitutionalism
that depended, in important respects, on the continued existence of
some form of judicial review. This 'experience,' in turn, motivated
political and legal efforts to 'reconcile' the new structures with ideas of
legitimacy inherited from the past.
Part iiof this article summarizes the debates over legislative delegation
and administrative justice in inter-war England to give a sense not only of
the intensity of this dialectic but also of the legal-political environment
in which Willis came of age as a scholar. Part III
turns to the two decades
after 1945 to examine efforts by legal and political actors in England to
arrive at a more or less stable settlement over the role ofjudicial review in
the administrative state. This settlement would build on four decades of
learning about the place of the courts - or, dare I say, the 'function' of
the courts - in the panoply of mechanisms designed to control and
supervise administrative discretion. The passage of the Tribunals and
Inquiries Act of 195829 marked the key turning point, after which the task
would become, in some sense, 'sub-constitutional,' shifting to the
development of substantive administrative law within the confines of the
constitutional settlement that emerged out of the debates of the middle
third of the twentieth century.
26 Review ofJennings, Cabinet Government, supra note 9 at 581.
27 Cf. Sarah Hanley, 'Engendering the State: Family Formation and State-Building in Early
Modern France' (1989) 16 French Historical Studies 4 at 5-6 (describing 'the historical
process as a renewable dialogue or cultural conversation, wherein history is culturally
ordered by existing concepts, or schemes of meaning, at play in given times and places;
and culture is historically ordered when schemes of meaning are revalued and revised
as persons act and reenact them over time. One might regard this process of reordering
as one that "counterfeits culture"; that is, as a process that replicates the perceived
original but at the same time (consciously or unconsciously) forges something quite
new.').

28 '[H]istorical change eventuates,' as E.P. Thompson once wrote, because changes in
material structures 'are experienced in social and cultural life, refracted in men's ideas
and their values, and argued through their actions, their choices and their beliefs.' E.P.
Thompson, 'History and Anthropology, Lecture Given at the Indian History Congress
(Dec. 30, 1976)' in E.P. Thompson, MakingfHistory: Writings on History and Culture (New
York: New Press/Norton, 1994) 200 at 222 ['History and Anthropology'].
29 6 Eliz. 2, c. 66.
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Willis viewed this process with sustained interest, even if from afar, and
he seems rarely to have missed an opportunity to relate the English and
Canadian developments where possible. This article concludes, then, by
reflecting on the writings of Willis at the end of his career in light of
efforts in post-war England to achieve a constitutional settlement over
the place ofjudicial review in administrative law.
II The debate over delegation and adininistrativejustice in inter-warEngland

Lord Hewart's infamous 1929 diatribe, The New Despotism, argued that
delegation of legislative and adjudicative powers to the executive posed a
grave threat to 'the two leading features' of the English constitution, 'the
Sovereignty of Parliament and the Rule of Law.' 30 Delegation to the executive was, in Hewart's estimation, 'an ingenious and adventurous' way
'to employ the one to defeat the other.' 31 The title of the book, of course,
was meant to bring to mind the political conflicts of the seventeenth
century that culminated in the revolution of 1688, destroying the 'old
despotism' and definitively establishing parliamentary sovereignty as the
central organizing principle of the English constitution. Bound up in this
triumph was a related development: the defeat of the crown's claimed
monopoly to adjudicate administrative disputes, akin to what the French
monarchy had successfully established during the same period (and
which would provide the foundation of the autonomous French system
of administrative justice that persists to this day).s2
The revolutionary settlement that modern England inherited from the
seventeenth century thus involved 'a double control of government
activity: control of legality in the courts and political control in Parlia-

30 Hewart, The New Despotism, supra note 2 at 17.
31 Ibid.
32 In France a royal edict of 1641 would prohibit ordinaryjudicial courts from reviewing
any matter 'which may concern the state, administration or government' (the Edict of
Saint-Germain of February 1641). In the same year, the English Parliament abolished
the Court of Star Chamber; it later abolished the remainder of the jurisdictions under
the control of the Privy Council in 1688. Thus, as the French monarchy was hardening
the division between administrative and ordinary justice in pursuit of the 'general
interest' of the state, the English Parliament's abolition of the conciliar courts meant
'the unchallenged dominance of the ordinary courts, the courts of common law' (J.D.B.
Mitchell, 'The Causes and Consequences of the Absence of a System of Public Law in
the United Kingdom' [1965] Pub.L. 95 at 97 ['Causes and Consequences']), within
which the concept of private property, and not the 'general interest,' would be the
guiding principle. For a more detailed discussion of the French experience, see Peter
Lindseth, '"Always Embedded" Administration: The Historical Evolution of Administrative justice as an Aspect of Modern Governance' in Christianjoerges, Bo Strhth, &
Peter Wagner, eds., The Economy as a Polity: the Political Constitution of Contemporary
Capitalism(London: UCL Press, forthcoming) ['Always Embedded'].
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ment.' 33 It was this seeming 'separation of powers,' and, in particular, the
separation of executive and adjudicative power, that Montesquieu had
celebrated as the central feature of the English constitution in De l'esprit
des lois in 1748. s4 During the nineteenth century, however, questions
began to be raised as to how well Montesquieu's construct actually
corresponded to the English reality. As F.W. Maitland would note just a
century after Montesquieu, 'It is curious that some political theorists
should have seen their favourite ideal, a complete separation of administration from judicature, realised in England; in England, in all places in
the world, where the two have for ages been inextricably blended. The
mistake,' Maitland continues, 'comes from lookingjust at the surface and
the showy parts of the constitution.' 35 The deeper constitutional reality despite the seeming achievements of 1688 - was that administrative
officers in England, in executing their legislatively appointed authority,
continued to make inquiries and render judgment on particular sets of
facts in light of general legal norms - in other words, to adjudicate in
everything but name - often without appeal to the ordinary courts. As
Willis himself aptly summarized in 1932, 'No amount of Montesquieu
and Dicey could blind students of practical government to the obvious
fact that the government departments have long been permitted by
statute to exercise powers of legislation and ajudicial decision delegated
to them by Parliament. '36
As William Robson would show in his seminal 1928 monograph,Justice
and Administrative Law, this form of administrative adjudication became
even more prominent '[w]ith the extension, during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, of the functions of government to one new field
after another.'3 7 This gave rise, Robson asserts, to 'a need for a technique
of adjudication better fitted to respond to the social requirements of the
time than the elaborate and costly system of enforcement provided by
litigation in the courts of law.' 38 In England, as elsewhere, adjudication of
administrative disputes required the interpretation of the regulatory
norms produced in the administrative sphere in pursuance of Parlia33 Mitchell, 'Causes and Consequences,' supra note 32 at 98.
34 Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, De l'espritdes loix..., 2 vols. (Gen~ve,
1748); De l'esprit des lois, 2 vols. (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), livre XI, c. VI, 'De la
Constitution d'Angleterre,' vol. 1 at 294-5; see also livre VI, c. VI, 'Que, dans la
monarchie, les ministres ne doivent pasjuger,' vol. 1 at 207-8.
35 Frederic William Maitland, 'The Shallows and Silences of Real Life' (1888) in The
Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland:Downing Professorof the Laws of England,vol.
1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911) at 478, quoted in William A. Robson,
Justice and Administrative Law: A Study of the British Constitution (London: Macmillan,
1928) at 26.
36 Willis, 'Delegation,' supra note 9 at 151.
37 Robson,Justice and Administrative Law, supra note 35 at 32.
38 Ibid.
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ment's legislative mandate. 39 Moreover, this case-by-case interpretation of
regulatory norms necessarily shaped the enabling legislation's effective
content by filling in gaps or clarifying the meaning of vague terms. In this
sense, administrative adjudication was intimately bound up with the
political purposes of the enabling legislation itself, as well as with the
regulatory scheme it established. 40 Administrative adjudication served as
a kind of 'commitment mechanism' (to use more modem game-theoretical language) 41 to ensure that the purposes of that scheme would be not
be sacrificed in the resolution of particularist disputes over implementation. And thus, as state intervention into economic and social affairs grew
over the course of the nineteenth century in England, adjudicative
powers were increasingly conferred on officials or tribunals that were not
classically 'judicial' in nature but, rather, were a part of the administrative
hierarchy, at the summit of which was a departmental minister responsible before Parliament.
Judicial criticisms of ministerial power in the inter-war period, like that
of Lord Hewart, thus came after nearly a century of deterioration in the
constitutional position of the ordinary courts relative to ministerial
power, a process that was largely incremental and therefore went unnoticed and uncontested until the early twentieth century. 42 While it would
be wrong to say that the result was an autonomous 'system' of administrative justice akin to what France developed over the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (with a supreme administrative court - the Conseil
d'6tat - sitting atop a hierarchy of subordinate administrative tribunals),
there was nevertheless a kind of convergence with the French experience, in which a whole range of administrative conduct affecting the
rights of private interests was excluded from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.43 The adjudicative decisions of English administrative
officials were sometimes, but not necessarily, subject to judicial review;
the extent of review depended on the regulatory domain and the provi-

39 An example is the Poor Law Board established under the PoorLawAmendmentAct, 1834,
3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 103. For a general discussion, see Cecil T. Carr, ConcerningEnglish
AdministrativeLaw (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941) at 4-6.
40 As Willis would later write, administrative adjudication involves an agency or board
'working out its bus system policy, its securities selling policy.' Willis, 'Administrator as
Judge,' supra note 9 at 434.
41 See Lindseth, 'Paradox,' supra note 7.
42 On the expansion of delegated legislative and adjudicative powers in England, see Carr,
ConcerningEnglishAdministrativeLaw, supra note 39 at, c. 1, 'The Eighteen-Thirties and
After.' For legislative power, see also Cecil T. Carr, Delegated Legislation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1921), as well as Willis, ParliamentaryPowers, supra note 1;
and for adjudicative power in England, see also Robson,Justice andAdministrativeLaw,
supra note 35.
43 See generally Lindseth, 'Always Embedded,' supra note 32.
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sions of the governing legislation." It was the judges' increasing realization of this state of affairs in the 1920s - 'a growing consciousness that
governmental organization no longer squared with legal theory,' as Willis
puts it in ParliamentaryPowers45 - that led to the intense criticisms of
ministerial powers from the bench.
The persistence of the notion that England lived under a system of a
strict separation of powers, as well as its corollary - the 'Rule of Law' - as
enforced by the ordinary courts, was of course due to the extraordinary
influence on the legal profession of Dicey's Law of the Constitution,
published first in 1885.46 Felix Frankfurter, observing the situation from
the American perspective in 1936, described Dicey's book as an 'instance
of sociological error surviving through charm and style, and of the
aesthetic appeal of a magnificently simple generalization.'47 Dicey's
generalization had two principal elements: first, that the powers of the
crown in England 'must be exercised in accordance with ordinary
common law principles which govern the relation of one Englishman to
another'; 48 and, second, that the very idea of a separate body of principles
governing public action - a droit administratif- was 'absolutely foreign to
English law,' because by definition the elaboration of such principles
does 'not lie within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.' 4 9 For Dicey,
'[t]his essential difference' - the exercise of adjudicative power by
anything other than a judicial court - 'render[ed] the identification of
droit administratifwithany branch of English law an impossibility.'50
By the end of Dicey's long career, however, even he could not ignore
the weight of the evidence that a form of autonomous administrative law
was in fact emerging in England, its development taking place largely
outside the jurisdiction of the common law courts." This realization,
published in 1915, did not mean that other lawyers raised on his orthodox teachings were ready to arrive that the same conclusion. Lord Chief
44 On the extraordinary variety of adjudicative procedures in the British administrative
state in the early twentieth century, see generally Robson,JusticeandAdministrativeLaw,
supra note 35 at c. III. See also Memoranda Submitted by Government Departments in Reply
to Questionnaire of November 1929 and Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee on
Ministers'Powers(London: HMSO, 1932) [Memoranda Submitted].
45 Willis, ParliamentaryPowers, supra note I at 29.
-46 A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), 10th ed.
(London: Macmillan, 1959) [Law of the Constitution].
47 Felix Frankfurter, 'Foreword' in W. IvorJennings, 'Courts and Administrative Law The Experience of English Housing Legislation' (1936) 49 Harv.L.Rev. 426 ['Courts
and Administrative Law'].
48 Dicey, Law of the Constitution,supra note 46 at 387.
49 Ibid. at 388.
50 Ibid.
51 A.V. Dicey, 'The Development of Administrative Law in England' (1915) 31 L.Q.Rev.
148. See also W.J.L. Ambrose, 'The NewJudiciary' (1910) 26 L.Q.Rev. 203.
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Justice Hewart himself, speaking to the American Bar Association in
1927, continued to assert that the common law did 'not recognize any
droit administratif Every person, whatever position he might occupy
within the State, is subject to the law of the land, and there are no special
tribunals for the trial of matters in which public departments or Ministers
of State are concerned.' 5 2 Perhaps Hewart's own uncomfortable realization that this beloved maxim was no longer valid was the thing that
prompted him to write what might still lay claim to being the most
famous (or perhaps infamous) book in the history of English administrative law in the early twentieth century. What the modem advocates of
executive power were trying to pass off as an emergent English system of
'administrative law' t laftanaise,Hewart asserted, was a system of 'administrative lawlessness' characterized by an absence of procedural protections and rights of appeal to the judicial courts.53
The sudden intensification of criticism directed at administrative
justice in England in the late 1920s (of which The New Despotism, as John
Willis notes in ParliamentaryPowers, was merely the most prominent
example)54 resulted, one could argue, from the ever larger encroachment by the administrative sphere into the core province of the ordinary
courts - the protection of the rights of private property as guaranteed-at
common law.55 English housing law litigation was seen as the best example of the conflict between the mindset of the judicial courts and the
interventionist aims of the new administrative state in Britain.56 Modem
housing legislation interfered with common law rights of property
owners (notably the freedom of contract) in any number of ways, imposing duties of repair and obligating landlords to conform to a whole range
of standards, even, indeed, to transfer their property to the local authorities. More importantly, the prevailing statutes conferred a whole range of
52 The Times, 2 September 1927 and 30 September 1927, quoted in Robson, Justice and
AdministrativeLaw, supra note 35 at 30.
53 See generally Hewart, The New Despotism, supra note 2 at c. IV.
54 For a succinct summary, see Willis, ParliamentaryPowers, supra note 1 at 39-40. See also
Carleton KempAllen, BureaucracyTriumphant(London: Oxford University Press, 1931);
Chih-Mai Chen, Parliamentary Opinion of Delegated Legislation (PhD dissertation,
Columbia University, 1933). As Harold Laski would put it twenty years later, 'An irresponsible Lord ChiefJustice, like Lord Hewart, and an academic lawyer whose hatred
of change is even greater than his persuasive rhetoric, like Dr C.K. Allen, are only the
best known names in a dramatic rearguard action that has been fought for many years
now against a phantom army of bureaucrats lusting for power....' Harold J. Laski,
Reflections on the Constitution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1951) at 42.
55 Jennings, 'Courts and Administrative Law,' supra note 47 at 443-4.
56 See generally John Griffith, JudicialPolitics since 1920: A Chronicle (Oxford: Blackwell,
1993) at 18-24 Uudicial Politics]. The second and third editions (1947 and 1951
respectively) of Robson,Justice and AdministrativeLaw, supra note 35, also recount this
history in detail.
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legislative and adjudicative powers on local officials, 'sometimes with and
sometimes without the consent of the Minister of Health,
and sometimes
57
courts.'
the
to
appeal
an
without
sometimes
and
with
Statutory interpretation, particularly with regard to housing legislation, was also a terrain for contentious legal battles between courts and
government departments, as well as other increasingly powerful administrative authorities. Most famously, there was the basic question of the
reviewability of delegated legislation: although executive acts were, in the
English tradition, presumptively reviewable, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy left open the possibility that Parliament could choose,
through privative clauses and other devices, to place delegated legislation
beyond the judicial control of the ordinary courts. 5 It was a matter of
interpreting the language in the particular enabling act in question. In
this regard, the courts had a good deal of difficulty with statutes that
provided that subordinate legislative measures should 'have effect as if
enacted in this Act.'59 In 1894, at a time when the powers of administrative bodies were less controversial in England, the House of Lords
interpreted such language as precluding judicial review of the subordinate legislation at issue, in effect conferring on the resulting ministerial
rules and orders the constitutional status of the statute its.elf.6° The 1894
decision turned, in large measure, on the doctrine of parliamentary
control over the department in question, stressing that the subordinate
legislation had to 61
be 'laid before' Parliament and hence that Parliament
had 'full control.'
In 1931, however, the House of Lords overruled this earlier holding in
its famous decision in the Yaffe case. 2 At issue was the meaning of s. 40(5)
of the Housing Act of 1925,63 which provided that an order of the
Minister of Health confirming a housing scheme of a local authority
'shall have effect as if enacted in this Act.' Lord Hewart had singled out
this provision as one among many he regarded as an excessive delegation
to the executive. 64 The Minister of Health, in opposition to a judicial
application by property owners to quash an order confirming a housing
57 Jennings, 'Courts and Administrative Law,' supra note 47 at 437.
58 Carr, ConcerningEnglish AdministrativeLaw, supra note 39 at 47.
59 For an overview, including list of examples, see Willis, ParliamentayPowers, supra note
1 at 23-4.
60 Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood, [1894] A.C. 347 [Lockwood].
61 Mitchell, 'Causes and Consequences,' supra note 32 at 101, quoting the opinion of
Lord Herschell in Lockwood ('"it must be remembered that it" [sciL: a wide discretionary
power of legislating] "is committed to a public department, and a public department
largely under the control of Parliament itself"').
62 Minister of Health v. The King (on the Prosecutionof Yaffe), [1931] A.C. 494.
63 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 14.
64 Hewart, The New Despotism, supra note 2 at 246. For his long list of other examples, see
ibid. at c. X.
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scheme, argued that the court was powerless to review this decision in
light of s. 40(5). The Divisional Court agreed, 65 but the Court of Appeal
reversed,66 with one appellate judge calling s. 40(5) a 'kind of Star
Chamber clause' that, if interpreted in favour of the Minister's position,
would allow those exercising delegated legislative power 'to contravene
[legislatively mandated] conditions, and make ultra vires orders which
cannot be controlled by the Courts which have to administer the laws of
the land.' 67 The House of Lords affirmed the Court of Appeal on the
interpretation of s. 40(5) but, on the merits, held that the housing
scheme approved by the minister was valid. 68
For supporters, the decision of the House of Lords obviated the need
for any more 'Uludicial ingenuity ... in explaining away the decision of
1894. ' 69 For detractors, however, the Yaffe case was deeply troubling to
the prospects of interventionist government. First, it took two years of
appeals before the legality of the housing scheme in Yaffewas definitively
settled, which, in the eyes of critics such as Ivor Jennings, was strong
evidence of the deleterious effects of excessive judicial involvement in
administrative decision making. ('Social reform is useless if it is not
rapid,' he wrote.7 0 ) Second, the basic premises of certain judicial opinions in the case were regarded as excessively hostile to the very purposes
of the housing legislation (which Jennings maintained was 'to remedy
social evils by interfering with the rights of landowners'7 1 ).
In a detailed analysis published in the Harvard Law Review in 1936,
Jennings saw evidence in Yaffe of incorrect judicial 'presumptions'
regarding parliamentary intent in housing legislation. 72 For example, in
the opinion of Lord Thankerton, '[t] he true principle of construction of
such delegation by Parliament of its legislative function is that it confers
only a limited power on the Minister, and that, unless Parliament expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court has the right and
duty to decide whether the Minister has acted within the limits of his

65 [1930] 2KB. 98.
66
67
68
69

[1930]2 KB. 133.
Ibid. at 148, perLordJustice Scrutton.
[1931] A.C. 494.
Car, ConcerningEnglish Administrative Law, supra note 39 at 48; see also Report of the
Committee on Ministers'Powers,supra note 7 at 40.
70 Jennings, 'Courts and Administrative Law,' supra note 47 at 447.
71 Ibid. at 451.
72 Willis also analysed the Yaffe case in detail, seeing it as the ultimate example of the
'judicial approach' to administrative law. 'Three Approaches,' supra note 5 at 67-9.
Earlier in the same article Willis refers to the judicial approach as 'uncompromisingly
individualistic' and 'uncompromisingly hostile to the executive,' involving the
'application of presumptions' rooted in 'an ideal constitution in the minds of the
judges.' Ibid. at 60-1. See also Willis, 'Nutshell,' supra note 9 at 17-23.
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delegated power.' 73 Jennings criticized similar reasoning in R_ v. Minister
of Health, ex parte Davis, in which Lord Hewart had opined that, in
interpreting the powers granted to local authorities under the Housing
Act of 1925, the authority would have only such powers as were 'expressed in unambiguous terms' in the statute.7 4 ForJennings, these and
the many other cases he analysed simply represented the 'highly individualistic and conservative' outlook of the judiciary, whose bias in favour of
private property and individual rights 'result[ed]75in a tendency to give a
restricted interpretation to the grant of powers.'
Despite the heated rhetoric on both sides of the debate over delegation and judicial review, however, there was still a basic consensus on the
necessity of some form of independent legal control over the widening
legislative and adjudicative discretion of government departments and
subordinate authorities. Although Hewart expressed distrust for what he
called the 'Continental system of "Administrative Law"' (seeing it as
'profoundly repugnant ... to English ideas'), he acknowledged that it 'is
at least a system. It has its Courts, its law, its hearings and adjudications,
its regular and accepted procedure,' in stark contrast to the evolving
'administrative lawlessness' in England.7 6 Jennings, on the other hand,
stated that '[a] dministrative lawyers are as much concerned with private
interests and the maintenance of just methods of control as private
lawyers'; his concern, rather, was over interpretations of statutes in the
ordinary courts that were 'against public policy in the interests of private
property.' ForJennings, divesting the judicial courts ofjurisdiction over
administrative disputes was justified precisely because common law
judges lacked the proper77commitment to the policy goals defined in
public welfare legislation.
The real debate, therefore, was not over the necessity of independent
legal control but, rather, over which judges could best balance the often
conflicting interests of private rights and public welfare - those sitting on
the ordinary courts, or those who were part of some hypothetical hierarchy of administrative tribunals. Willis, for his part, approached the question 'functionally' and thus squarely favoured 'the constitution of a
special court' that would be 'composed of persons trained in the whole
law pertaining to administration' and having 'sufficient knowledge of the
legislation which is to be put into force to decide upon evidence to it
73
74
75
76
77

Yaffe, supra note 68 at 532.
[1929] 1 K.B. 619 at 625 (C.A.).
Jennings, 'Courts and Administrative Law,' supra note 47 at 434.
Hewart, The New Despotism, supra note 2 at 12-3.
As Willis puts it, 'A court's speculation about the policy of statutes dealing with "lawyer's
law" is very likely to be right: about the policy of social reform statutes, of which it is
almost certainly ignorant, and to which it is probably hostile, very likely to be wrong.'
'Nutshell,' supra note 9 at 4 [citations omitted].
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what in the particular case it is best to do.' 78 The only thing 'stand [ing] in
the way,' Willis asserted, was a 'misunderstood concept' that control of
administrative discretion must be in the hands of an ordinary judge in a
common law court.79
Given the cultural force of this 'misunderstood concept,' however,
Willis recognized that the establishment of a genuinely autonomous
system of administrative justice in England, or in Britain more generally,
was never a real likelihood. The attachment to the ordinary courts as
enforcers of the rule of law was in some sense too embedded in the
constitutional history of the country for it to be abandoned in favour of a
system on the continental model. Evidence of this embeddedness can be
found in the 1932 report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers, set up
in 1929 by the Lord Chancellor to examine the entire question of
delegated legislation and judicial review in response to the contentious
debate that followed the publication of The New Despotism. The committee's terms of reference, progressive critics believed, reflected too great a
'devotion to Dicey's memory, in that the terms asked for a report on
'what safeguards are desirable or necessary to secure the constitutional
principles of the sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of the
Law.' 8 ' Thus, by emphasizing 'the supremacy of the Law,' the terms of
reference in some sense assumed its conclusion, at least so far as the
continuation of thejurisdiction of the ordinary courts over administrative
disputes was concerned. Not surprisingly, the committee, 'without
hesitation, advise [d] against [the] adoption' of an autonomous system of
administrative justice organically attached to the executive, on the
French model.8 2
The Committee on Ministers' Powers issued its report unanimously,
which is notable given the presence on the committee of Harold Laski,
who, given his leading role among English functionalists, might perhaps
have been inclined to a more radical rethinking of the structures of legal
control. Instead, Laski supported the majority on preserving judicial
review but inserted a 'note' in an appendix on 'the Judicial Interpretation of Statutes' as a means of qualifying or clarifying his support. His
note opens by concurring that 'the interpretation of statutes which
define and control the administrative process (whether local or central)'
should remain the responsibility of the ordinary courts, which offered
78
79
80
81

'Three Approaches,' supra note 5 at 80-1.
Ibid. at 81.
Carr, ConcerningEnglish Administrative Law, supra note 39 at 27.
Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,supra note 7 at 1. Robson laments that, as a
consequence of the terms of reference, the Committee 'started life with the dead hand
of Dicey on its neck.' William A. Robson, 'The Report of the Committee on Ministers'
Powers' (1932) 3 Pol.Q. 351.
82 Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,ibid. at 110.
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'the value of the independent assessment of statutory intention.'83
However, Laski also deeply criticizes the prevailing methods of statutory
interpretation in the judicial courts, which had regularly invoked common law principles 'to narrow [statutory] purposes in a way which
defeated the clear intention' of Parliament in adopting the legislation. s4
Presaging Willis's own various contributions on the question of statutory
interpretation later in the decade, 5 Laski calls for a method of interpretation 'less analytical and more functional in character; it should seek to
discover the effect of the legislative precept in action so as to give full
weight to the social value it is intended to serve.' 86 To this end, he
suggests that statutes henceforth contain a preambular 'authoritative
explanation of intention' 8 7 and that, more generally, there be an 'enlargement of the sources of interpretation.'88
The interpretive approach supported by Laski carried its own risks,
however, notably in the extent of effective normative power it transferred
to the judge, using what may well be vaguely expressed legislative purposes (or purposes that the judge simply imputes to the drafters without
strong evidence) to interpret a statute in the most expansive manner
possible. The danger of aggressive use of adjudication to move beyond
any intent that could be reasonably attributed to the legislature was well
expressed by Cecil Carr, a British expert in the development of English
administrative law, in the Carpentier Lectures at Columbia University in
the fall of 1940:
One eminent writer [Ivor Jennings] has challengingly stated that the whole
purposes of our English Housing Acts is to remedy social evils by interfering with
the rights of landowners. If the sponsors of those Acts had proclaimed that to be
their object, does anyone imagine that the Acts would have been so easily
passed?"
At issue, ultimately, was how far an administrative statute in its actual
operation could be detached from the intent, however confused or
83 Ibid., Annex V at 135.
84 Ibid. In Laski's view, the British courts generally'exaggerate [d] the degree to which the
intention of Parliament may be discovered from the words of a statute,' but more
importantly, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, they 'under-estimate[d] the degree to
which the personality of the judge ... plays a part in determining the intention he
attributes to Parliament.' Ibid., citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)
(Holmes J. dissenting) (calling the personality of the judge the 'inarticulate major
premise' in judicial logic).
85 See, e.g., Willis, 'Nutshell,' supra note 9.
86 Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,supra note 7, Annex V at 137.
87 Ibid. at 136.
88 Ibid. at 137.
89 Carr, ConcerningEnglishAdministrativeLaw, supra note 39 at 28, citingJennings, 'Courts
and Administrative Law,' supra note 47.
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contradictory, of the legislative majority that adopted it. This was another
way of asking, How much normative autonomy should the administrative
body have? For the followers of Dicey, who assumed that 'the purpose of
the constitution was the protection of individual rights' 90 - in the sense of
property rights classically conceived rather than the emergent social
rights in the welfare state - an administrative body should possess only so
much normative autonomy as was expressly conferred under the statute,
narrowly construed. For those who argued that the constitution had
evolved well beyond Dicey's laissez-fairevision (Willis, Laski, Robson, and
Jennings, to name a few), an administrative body should enjoy however
much autonomy was functionally necessary to achieve the broadly
defined social ends of the statute. The difference in these views, Carr
writes,
indicates a healthy clash between political philosophies. If the progressives seek
to write off Dicey as a poor old Victorian Whig who could not escape from the
background of his individualistic dogmatism, his ghost might legitimately rejoin
that the ideologies of his opponents were unmistakable too. 9'
It became the responsibility of the Committee on Ministers' Powers, in
its 1932 report, to find a workable balance between these two philosophies. The committee quotes with approval a report issued the previous
year noting that the most distinctive feature of modem governance in
England had been the 'growing preoccupation, irrespective of party, with
the management of the life of the people.' 92 This new and laudable
orientation had dangers as well as merits:
It is of vital importance that the new policy, while truly promoting liberty by
securing better conditions of life for the people of this country, should not, in its
their initiative and independence which
zeal for interference, deprive them of
9 3
are the nation's most valuable assets.
The committee focused on 'the danger incidental to the particular
method by which the new policy is carried out, namely, the practice of
entrusting legislative and judicial functions to the Executive.' 94 The
committee's general conclusion was 'that the system of delegated
legislation is both legitimate and constitutionally desirable for certain
purposes,' stressing pressures on parliamentary time, the technicality of
regulatory subject matters, the need for flexibility in the face of unforeseen contingencies, and, indeed, even opportunities for regulatory expe90 Ibid. at 27-8.
91 Ibid. at 28.
92 Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,supra note 7 at 5, quoting Report of the Committee
of Science and Industry, Cmd. 3897 (London: HMSO, 1931) at 4-5.
93 Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,ibid. at 5 [internal quotation marks omitted].
94 Ibid.
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rimentation.95 The report rejects sweeping denunciations from the likes
of Lord Hewart, finding that Hewart's criticisms, rather than destroying
the case for delegation, simply demonstrated 'that there are dangers in
96
the practice; that it is liable to abuse; and that safeguards are required.'
Although the committee regarded judicial safeguards as important,
the report stresses above all the necessity of more effective forms of
parliamentary control. Delegation 'does to some extent entail an abandonment by Parliament of its legislative functions,' the committee
notes.97 Moreover, there was 'at present no effective machinery for
Parliamentary control over the many regulations of a legislative character
that are made every year by Ministers in pursuance of their statutory
powers.'9 8 Adding to the problem was the extraordinary complexity of the
administrative sphere: 'Delegated legislation takes many forms,' and
[t] he limits of delegated power, the methods of Ministerial procedure, and the
safeguards for the protection of the public or the preservation of Parliamentary
control thus appear often to have been dictated by opportunistic considerations,
peculiar to the occasion. 9
The report thus calls for an overhaul of the Rules Publication Act of
1893'0° to render procedures more uniform and coherent and to standardize the procedures for direct parliamentary oversight - that is, the socalled laying procedures. 10 '
Overall, the committee emphasized the need for an augmented role
for Parliament in the regulatory process, which in the first instance
should be expressed through greater clarity and consistency in legislative
drafting. 10 2 This proposal was related to what the report calls the 'essen-

95
96
97
98
99

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

at 51.
at 54.
at 6.
at 16. To make the point, the committee published as a separate volume the

memoranda submitted by government departments outlining the extraordinary variety
of their legislative and adjudicative powers and the various extents to which such powers
were subject to parliamentary andjudicial control. See MemorandaSubmitted, supra note
44.
100 56 &57 Vict., c. 66.
101 Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,supra note 7 at 67. These laying procedures
became the favored form of parliamentary supervision over the course of the
nineteenth century, although their use intensified in the twentieth. For a succinct
summary of the historical development, see Sir Cecil Carr, 'Legislative Control of
Administrative Rules and Regulations: II. Parliamentary Supervision in Britain' (1955)
30 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1045 at 1045-7 ['Parliamentary Supervision in Britain'].
102 Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,ibid. at 58 ('that whenever legislative power
is delegated, the limits of the power will be clearly defined in the statute by which it is
delegated').
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tially subordinate character of delegated legislation.' 10 3 Parliament was
supreme and could therefore interfere with private rights in any way it
desired, but no administrative or executive official could interfere with
such rights without the sanction of Parliament. 'It follows, therefore,' the
committee concludes, 'that to safeguard [this principle] the precise
limits of law-making power, which Parliament intends to confer on the
Minister, should always be defined in clear language by the statute which
confers it." 4 As a means of enforcement, the committee further suggests
that,
[e]xcept where immunity from challenge is intentionally conferred, there
should not be anything in the language of the statute even to suggest a doubt as
to the right and duty of the Courts of Law to decide in any particular case
whether the Minister has acted within the limits of his power.'0 5
While few of the committee's proposals would actually make their way
into law over the remainder of the 1930s, 10 6 the committee's report would
nevertheless serve as the point of departure for post-1945 reform discussions on delegated legislative and adjudicative power in England.'0 7 In a
pragmatic fashion, the committee described the changing nature of
modern governance at the national level, notably the diffusion and
fragmentation of normative power among national and subnational
executive and administrative bodies, as well as among public, quasipublic, and traditionally private entities.108 Following the lines of Willis's
Parliamentary Powers, the committee found that the phenomenon of
delegation was not inherently dangerous, but, contra Willis, this diffusion
of authority did require safeguards to 'reconcile' it with the values of
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law inherited from the past.
The legal and political formula for that reconciliation, the committee
suggested, would involve some combination of direct legislative oversight,
ministerial responsibility, andjudicial review. All these elements, working
together, would best ensure that administrative officials, who enjoyed a
fusion of legislative, executive, and judicial functions, remained within
the scope of their 'essentially subordinate' delegated authority while
103
104
105
106
107

Ibid. at 20.
Ibid. at 21.
Ibid. at 65.
See Carr, ConcerningEnglishAdministrativeLaw, supra note 39 at 175-6, for an overview.
See, e.g., Report from the Select Committee on DelegatedLegislation, together with the Proceedings
of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence andAppendices (London: HMSO, 1953) [Reportfrom
the Select Committee].
108 'Ministers of the Crown are the chief repositories of such powers,' the committee writes,
'but they are conferred also, in differing degrees upon Local Authorities, statutory
corporations and companies, Universities, and representative bodies of solicitors, doctors and other professions.' Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powerssupra note 7 at 4.
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acting reasonably and respecting private rights to the extent possible in
the achievement of legislatively defined public ends.
III

The post-war constitutional"settlementregardingjudicial review

Britain emerged from World War II with its basic pre-war constitutional
structure intact, the cornerstone of which was the theoretical supremacy
and sovereignty of Parliament. Even if the cabinet had enjoyed extraordinarily broad powers during the war, this fact did little to delegitimize
delegation perse, as it had in France and Germany for obvious reasons.'0 9
As S.A. de Smith observed a decade after the war, 'After 1939 the readiness of all parties to concede wide regulatory powers to the state lowered
the temperature' of the prewar controversy over delegation."0 The
practice of delegation was broadly understood as a necessary means of
strengthening the state in the face of the difficult tasks of national
reconstruction and renewal, just as it once had been seen as essential to
organizing the national defence."' It was also conventionally understood
that (at least as a political matter) Parliament itself should decide matters
of 'principle' in the statute and leave only the task of filling in the 'details' to the minister concerned.' 1 2 However, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy also meant that the task of policing the boundary between the parliamentary and the ministerial spheres would be left almost
entirely to the political process (whereas in other countries it would be
subject to judicial review under reinvigorated non-delegation principles) .113
For the most part, debates in post-war England focused less on 'the
propriety of delegation' (as they had in the inter-war period) and more
on 'the mechanics of control,"' 4 notably through a rationalization of the
109 See Lindseth, 'Paradox,' supra note 7.
110 S.A. de Smith, 'Rule of Law,' Book Review of Rule of Law: A Study by the Inns of Court of
the Conservative and Unionist Society (1955) 69 Harv.L.Rev. 396 at 398.
111 See the Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 62, pursuant to which the
wartime Defence Regulations were issued. As for the major post-war legislation
extending these regulatory powers into peacetime, see Supplies and Services (Transitional
Powers)Act, 1945, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 10; Emergency Laws (TransitionalProvisions)Act, 1946,
9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 26; Supplies and Services (Extended Purposes)Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6,
c. 55; and Emergency Laws (MiscellaneousProvisions)Act, 194 7, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 10. The
post-war Labour government also adopted legislation relating to nationalizations, the
National Health Service, town and country planning, transport, and agriculture that
delegated significant regulatory powers as well.
112 See Memorandum of Cecil Carr in Reportfrom the Select Committee on DelegatedLegislation,
together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (London:
HMSO, 1953) at 7-8. In fact, extraordinarily broad delegations were often made. For
a useful set of examples, see ibid.
113 Lindseth, 'Paradox,' supra note 7.
114 Carr, 'Parliamentary Supervision in Britain,' supra note 101 at 1052.
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system of parliamentary oversight of delegated legislation. Although this
oversight would inevitably prove imperfect, its existence suggests one
important thing about the post-war administrative state in England:
hierarchical control of administrative rule making by government
ministers alone could not, solely on the basis of ministerial responsibility
before Parliament, legitimize delegated legislative powers in democratic
terms. Rather, some other form of parliamentary involvement would
prove necessary to 'democratize' delegation in a manner consistent with
English constitutional traditions.
Among the problems with existing mechanisms of parliamentary
oversight was their seeming incoherence. The Committee on Ministers'
Powers of 1932 had examined in detail the procedures for 'laying'
subordinate legislation before Parliament and found that it was 'impossible to discover any rational justification for the existence of so many
different forms of laying or on what principle Parliament acts in deciding
which should be adopted in any particular enactment' 115 - mere laying,
affirmative, or negative.' 1 6 The committee was further troubled by the
'extraordinary and quite illogical differences' in the time periods during
which a member could make a prayer to annul under the negative
procedure.' 1 7 Finally, it found confusing the variety of terms used - regulations, rules, Orders in Council - to describe the legislative instruments
produced by ministers under specific enabling acts.
The Statutory Instruments Act of 1946'18 was an attempt to address
some of these concerns. It standardized the laying period at forty days119
and gave the descriptive title of 'statutory instruments' to all subordinate
legislation, regardless of how these instruments were designated in the
enabling act. 20 It further provided for the numbering and publication of
all statutory instruments as soon as they were made. As an additional step
in rationalizing the system of publicity, subsequent regulations adopted
pursuant to the act provided for the publication of an annual compendium of all instruments made the prior year, as well as of a table showing
115 Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,supra note 7 at 42.
116 The various laying-before procedures are summarized in ibid. at 41-2; see also Bernard
Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain:A ComparativeStudy (New York: New York
University Press, 1949) at 104; John E. Kersell, ParliamentarySupervision of Delegated
Legislation: The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealandand Canada(London: Stevens &
Sons, 1960) at 15-6.
117 Report of the Committee on Ministers'Powers,supra note 7 at 42. In some cases the period
was as great as 100 days or as little as twenty, but laying periods of forty, thirty-six thirty,
twenty-eight, and twenty-one days were also common. In addition, the statutes varied
as to whether the laying period ran only during days on which Parliament actually sat
and as to whether only calendar days were included.
118 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 36; see also Statutory Instruments Regulations, 1947, S.I. 1948/1; and
Statutory Instruments (ConfirmatoryPowers) Order, 1947, S.I. 1948/2.
119 Ss. 5 and 6.
120 S. 1.
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the effects of any new statutory instruments on existing instruments, a
particularly useful tool for practitioners. 121 The act did not, however,
impose a uniform laying procedure, which meant that future Parliaments
would still be free to determine, on a case-by-case basis, in light of the
interests concerned as well as the regulatory domain in question, the
appropriate form of laying, if any.
The laying procedures were expressive of a basic premise of British
public law in the immediate post-war years, that the control of delegated
legislative power was at its core a political question, to be played out in
the parliamentary sphere. The courts had long found that, because the
laying procedures purportedly gave parliament 'full control, ' 122 limited
judicial review necessarily followed. As Lord Greene, the Master of the
Rolls in the Court of Appeal, stated in 1947, 'The common law does not
control Parliament, and if Parliament confers on a Minister a power to
make regulations, how can the court enquire into these regulations
beyond ascertaining whether they are within the power?' 123 Although this
passage appears in a context pertaining to ministerial oversight of local
authorities, it fairly describes a more basic judicial attitude. Short of a
showing that the administrative act was ultra vires, judicial deference to
the minister was required because, according to the statutory directive
from Parliament, 'the ultimate arbiter is the Minister himself.' 1 24 The
minister, in turn, derived his authority from - and was politically responsible to - Parliament; and thus it was for Parliament, and not the courts,
to develop the first line of controls over the exercise of executive and
administrative power.
The courts also refused to consider whether Parliament's 'full control'
in reality meant the kind of 'full scrutiny' that might trulyjustify a limited
role of the courts (there was plenty of room for doubt in this regard). 125
Rather, the solution was again political and parliamentary, not judicial.
In 1944, the House of Commons established a standing committee to
scrutinize the executive's exercise of delegated legislative powers after
,some persistent back-benchers induced a previously reluctant Leader of
the House' to do so.' 2 6 The Scrutiny Committee, as it was commonly
121 For a detailed discussion, along with other publications and research tools for the
practitioner, see House of Commons Library Document No. 5, Access to Subordinate
Legislation (London: HMSO, 1963).
122 See discussion of Lockwood, supra note 60.
123 Taylor v. Brighton Borough Council, [1947] K.B. 736 at 739.
124 Ibid. at 748-9.
125 Mitchell, 'Causes and Consequences,' supra note 32 at 101.
126 Carr, 'Parliamentary Supervision in Britain,' supra note 114 at 1049. The Lords had
established such a committee in the 1920s, but only to examine instruments subject to
the affirmative procedure. The Committee on Ministers' Powers of 1932 had
recommended the establishmentof standing committees in each house with the responsibility of overseeing the executive's exercise of delegated legislative powers.
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called, was not to consider the policy or the merits of an instrument
(questions believed best left to the relevant minister and his subordinates), nor was it to examine the question of legal validity (believed best
left to the courts). Its terms of reference nevertheless authorized it to
draw the attention of the Commons to any 'unusual or unexpected use of
the statutory power, ' 1 27 which meant that, in practice, the committee
'found itself peeping over the fence at questions of policy, merits, and
8
v ir e s . 12

Still, the number of instruments reported out by the committee was
generally very limited. Between the time of its establishment in 1944 and
the end of the 1953-1954 session, according to the counsel to the
Speaker of the House of Commons, the committee had examined 6 88629
instruments but had called the attention of the House to only sixty-six.'
This limited activity does not mean, however, that parliamentary scrutiny
of delegated legislation played little role in British political life in the
post-war years. Because any MP had the right to make a prayer for annulment (where the negative procedure applied), this presented a strategic
opportunity for opposition backbenchers to harass and annoy the
government. Such actions were particularly bothersome because prayers
to annul were heard at the end of each day, after the close of normal
business, and debates on them could last into the early morning hours.
Conservative backbenchers used the tactic to great effect after the 1950
general election, when Clement Attlee's Labour government was returned with a majority of only eight. 30 Labour backbenchers returned
the favour after the Conservatives came to power in 1951 with a majority
of only sixteen.
This sort of 'guerrilla warfare' was 'exhausting for both sides,"131 wrote
a conservative observer, and thus, by resolution of the House of Commons, a Select Committee on Delegated Legislation was established in
December 1952 to consider reforms. 1 32 Like the Committee on Ministers'
Powers of 1932, this body was designed to be bipartisan, including members recognized primarily for their breadth of knowledge about both

127
128
129
130

The full terms of reference are reprinted in ibid. at 1050, n.21.
Ibid. at 1050.
Ibid.
Attlee later recalled that'[i] t was not pleasant to have Members coming from hospital
at the risk of their lives to prevent a defeat in the House' on a prayer to annul a
statutory instrument. Clement Attlee, As It Happened (London: Heinemann, 1954) at
206.
131 C.K. Allen, Law and Orders:An Inquiry into the Natureand Scope ofDelegatedLegislationand
Executive Powers in English Law, 2d ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1956) at 188 [Law and

Orders].
132 The terms of reference can be found in Report from the Select Committee, supra note 107
at ii.
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executive and legislative spheres. 133 It also followed the 1932 example in
another, perhaps unintended, respect: its report actually led to very few
reforms (apart from a rule cutting off debate on prayers at 11:30 p.m.).
Rather, the Select Committee's basic finding could perhaps be summarized in the words of one of its members, who called the existing procedures for parliamentary
control 'quite illogical and everything else, but...
34
not too bad.1
Thus, as the 1950s proceeded, the public law debate in England
shifted its focus from delegated legislative to delegated adjudicativepower,
as well as to the nature and scope of judicial review, which in many
respects had been the more contentious issues in the inter-war period. In
the immediate post-war years, English academic commentators often
wrote with embarrassment of the state of their country's system of
administrative justice. On the one hand, the prevailing mindset was still
said to suffer from the residual influence of Dicey's inaccurate depiction
of the administrative law 'as a misfortune inflicted upon the benighted
folk across the Channel. ' 35 On the other hand, there was the reality of 'a
plethora of ad hoc tribunals,' appointed by ministers, not necessarily
sitting in public, sometimes excluding legal representation, with often
highly informal procedural and evidentiary rules, not always bound to
provide reasons for decisions,
and not necessarily subject to appeal to a
36
court on questions of law.
Unfavourable comparisons were made not only with the French
system of droitadministratifbutalso with the situation that prevailed in the
United States, Britain's common law confrbre, which had passed a farreaching Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.1 v As Harry Street wrote
in the Yale LawJournalin 1950: 'American administrative law is so much
more developed than the British that there is little for an American
lawyer to learn from the British experience - except to be on guard
against a weakening of judicial control. Cannot Marshall Plan Aid
include "administrative law"?1 3 3 Indeed, the widely recognized inadequacies of the British system of administrative justice in the late 1940s and
133 Three members were ex-Secretaries of State and three were former junior ministers.
Carr, 'Parliamentary Supervision in Britain,' supra note 114 at 1052.
134 Quoted in Allen, Law and Orders, supra note 131 at 191.
135 De Smith, 'Rule of Law,' supra note 110 at 398.
136 Ibid. at 397.
137 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237-44, codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-9 (1946). For a
comparison by an English commentator, written in the .immediate post-war period,
looking at both the French and American systems (with explicit reference to the rights
ofjudicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act), see Marguerite A. Sieghart,
Government byDecree:A ComparativeStudy of the History ofthe Ordinancein EnglishandFrench
Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1950) at 317.
138 H. Street, Book Review of Law and the Executive in Britain: A Comparative Study by
Bernard Schwartz (1950) 59 Yale L.J. 590 at 593.
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from the inter-war
early 1950s provided the terrain on which antagonists
139
period could now find a point of agreement.
The state of English administrative justice became a heated point of
public controversy after 1954 as a consequence of the so-called Crichel
Down Affair, which involved a dispute over the Ministry of Agriculture's
handling of a parcel of land that it had compulsorily purchased in 1937.
The details of this affair need not concern us here. 40 Suffice it to say
that, although the affair did not itself directly involve an administrative
tribunal, it did expose problems relating to administrative secrecy,
organizational complexity, the lack of clear lines of authority, and
opportunities for unfairness that these factors created (all problems said
to afflict the system of administrative justice as well). Moreover, the affair
exposed the limitations of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility:
although the minister in charge resigned as a consequence of the affair,
this was broadly regarded as 'a severe and perhaps excessive application
of the constitutional doctrine,' 141 since it was understood that no minister
could directly supervise the activities of the vast number of subordinates
implementing programs and exercising discretionary power in the field.
To quell the public outcry that flowed from the affair, the British
government established a Committee on Administrative Tribunals and
Enquiries in November 1955 to examine the question of administrative
justice. Known as the Franks Committee (after its chairman), this body
took evidence over the course of 1956 and early 1957 and issued its
report in July of that year. 142 The report begins by describing the political
reasons for the expansion of administrative adjudicative power. 'Since
the war,' it states, 'the British electorate has chosen Governments which
139 On the right, see C.K. Allen, 'Foreword' in Marguerite A. Sieghart, Government byDecree:
A ComparativeStudy of the History of the Ordinancein English and French Law (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1950) x at xiii, in which Allen concludes that 'the time has come, in
view of the great and increasing pressure of administrative problems,' to establish a
system of administrative tribunals on the French model to hear administrative disputes.
This suggestion was gladly welcomed on the left by William Robson, who wrote in 1951
that Allen was simply calling for 'reforms in the direction I have long regarded as
essential.' See William A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law: A Study of the British
Constitution, 3d ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1951) at 465. For a similar proposal, this
time again from the right, see Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society, Rule of
Law: A Study by the Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society (London: Conservative
Political Centre, 1955).
140 For a contemporary overview seeJ.A.G. Griffith, 'The Crichel Down Affair' (1955) 18
Mod.L.Rev. 557; see also Allen, Law and Orders,supra note 131 at 344-6.
141 Ibid. at 340.
142 Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries, Cmd. 218 (London:
HMSO, 1957); Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries, Minutes of Evidence (London: HMSO, 1956-1957); Committee on Administrative Tribunals and
Enquiries, Memoranda Submitted by Government Departments, 6 vols. (London: HMSO,
1956).
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accepted general responsibilities for the provision of extended social
services and for the broad management of the economy.1 43 These
expanded responsibilities required the passage of legislation that applied
'detailed schemes to the whole or large classes of the community (for
example national insurance) or [placed] on a Minister and other authorities a general duty to provide a service (for example education or
health).1 4 4 The terms of such public welfare legislation, however, were
'rarely sufficient ... to achieve all [their] objects,' thus necessitating the
14 5
delegation of both legislative and adjudicative powers to the executive.
Specifically as to adjudicative powers, the committee found that it was
now time 'to consider afresh the procedures by which the rights of
individual citizens can be harmonized with wider public interests. ' 146 The
report notes that the resolution of disputes regarding administrative
programs in England had never been entrusted exclusively or even
largely to the courts of law, the traditional dispensers of justice. The
report agrees with the Committee on Ministers' Powers of 1932 that
administrative 'tribunals have certain characteristics which give them
advantage over the courts. These are cheapness, accessibility, freedom
from technicality, expedition and expert knowledge of their particular
subject. 147 The general question before the committee, however, was
how best to characterize these tribunals: Are they 'part of the machinery
ofjustice,' or are they 'mere administrative expedients'?148 This question
was at the core of the constitutional struggle to stabilize administrative
governance in England in the first half of the twentieth century. Despite
the arguments of government witnesses 'that tribunals should properly
be regarded as part of the machinery of administration, for which the
Government must retain close and continuing responsibility,' the
committee emphatically found to the contrary. Tribunals were in fact
'part of the machinery provided by Parliament for adjudication,' respon149
sible, along with the courts, for the enforcement of the rule of law.
The reforms resulting from the issuance of the Franks Committee's
report (notably the passage of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act of 1958'50)
built directly on this premise. Although constituted as part of the administrative sphere and structured accordingly, administrative tribunals still
had a basic obligation to dispense justice in an independent fashion. The
143
144
145
146
147
148

Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries,supra note 142 at 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 9.
Bernard Schwartz & H.W.R. Wade, Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in
Britainand the United States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) at 151 [Legal Control].
149 Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunalsand Enquiries,supra note 142 at 9.
150 Supra note 29.
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committee placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the term
'tribunal,' as it appeared in the statutes, indicated intent on the part of
Parliament 'for a decision outside and independent of the Department
concerned.' 51 The Tribunals and Inquiries Act thus established a Council on Tribunals with broad consultative and review functions over the
15 2
procedures and constitution of tribunals in the administrative sphere.
Although the act itself did not specify a uniform code of tribunal procedure, the work of the Council on Tribunals over the subsequent decade
established 'a much clearer standard' of what was minimally necessarily
consistent with fairness. 15 3 This generally came to include a public hearing, the right to legal representation, the right to call witnesses, adversarial procedure, and the full disclosure of relevant documents.
Importantly, the act itself provided for extended rights of appeal to
judicial courts (reflective of the fundamentally subordinate character of
these tribunals on questions of law)' 54 as well as a requirement that
tribunals publicly provide reasons for their decisions (essential to effective judicial review)."'
The Franks Committee report and the passage of the Tribunals and
Inquiries Act of 1958 constituted a key turning point in the post-war
evolution of administrative law in England. Although it is difficult to
establish a direct causal relationship, the act arguably served as a 'catalyst
for reform' not merely within the administrative sphere but also within
the courts of law, which became noticeably 'more active and enterprising' after 1958.156 A new era in the development of administrative law
jurisprudence ensued, ending the extreme deference of the courts to the
151 Report ofthe Committee on AdministrativeTribunals andEnquiries,supra note 142 at 9. This
reasoning is reminiscent of the evolving thinking regarding French administrative
justice in the nineteenth century, in which the juridictionadministrativebecame distinct
from the administrationactive.It had been a basic tenet of French administrative law that
juger l'administration, c'est encore administrer- to judge the administration is still to
administer. However, as a leading commentator and member of the Conseil d'6tat
concluded in 1852, 'juger, c'estjuger' - to judge is to judge - meaning that parties to
administrative disputes should be entitled to a procedurally fair hearing by an
independent administrative judge, even if thatjudge is, formally speaking, attached to
the executive. See Alexandre-Franois Vivien, Etudes administratives, 2d. ed (Paris:
Guillaumin, 1852) at 130. For the definitive history of the separation of administrative
justice from active administration in France over the course of the nineteenth century,
see Jacques Chevallier, L 'Elaborationhistoriquedu principe de separationde la juridiction
administrativeet de l'administrationactive (Paris: LGDJ, 1970). This history is also briefly
traced in Lindseth, 'Always Embedded,' supra note 32.
152 A detailed analysis of the act can be found in Appendix I to S.A. de Smith, Judicial
Review of AdministrativeAction (London: Stevens & Sons, 1959) at 459-65.
153 Schwartz & Wade, Legal Control, supra note 148 at 153.
154 At s. 9.
155 At s. 12.
156 Schwartz & Wade, Legal Control supra note 148 at 5.

684

UNIVERSITIY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL

political imperatives of Parliament and the government in the immediate
post-war decade. This attitude had led to a series of disturbing precedents regarding the limited application of principles of procedural
fairness ('naturaljustice'), 57 deference to the discretionary powers of the
administration, 5 ' and a broad reading of statutory provisions precluding
judicial review.'59 Over the decade following the passage of the Tribunals
and Inquiries Act, the courts would reinvigorate the application of
principles of natural justice, 160 impose much stricter judicial limits on
ministerial discretion, 16 1 give a much more narrow reading to privative
clauses, 16 2 and more generally use the doctrine of3 ultra vires to review a
broad range of alleged administrative illegalities.16
Although one could fairly say that this sort of judicial activism in the
face of administrative power was precisely what Lord Hewart was calling
for when he published The New Despotism in 1929, there were several
major differences in the political and legal environment in the late 1950s
and early 1960s as compared to three decades earlier. After World War II,
few in the judiciary any longer seriously questioned (at least openly) the
right of the state to intervene actively in social and economic affairs, even
if this intervention conflicted with property rights.' 64 Consequently, the
greater activism of the English courts at the beginning of the 1960s was
not seen as a conservative attempt to protect the interests of private
property; rather, the courts were simply seeking the 'new balance
between private right and public advantage' that the Franks Committee
157 Nakuda Ali v. Jayaratne,[1951] A.C. 66; 1. v. MetropolitanPolice Commissioner ex parte
Parker; [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1150. In these cases, the courts refused to apply principles of
natural justice to a cancellation of a licence even though the holder's livelihood
depended on it.
158 See, e.g., Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning,[1947] KB. 702.
159 See, e.g., Woollett v. Ministry ofAgriculture and Fisheries, [1955] 1 Q.B. 103.
160 Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40.
161 Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Cure &Deeley Ltd., [1962] 1 Q.B. 340.
162 Anisminic Ltd. v. ForeignCompensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147.
163 For a summary, see Schwartz & Wade, Legal Control, supra note 148 at 299. For a
detailed historical consideration of increasingjudicial activism in the early 1960s, see
John Griffith, JudicialPolitics,supra note 56 at c. 4.
164 As Willis himself describes in his review of Denning's Freedom under the Law (1949),
Lord Justice.Denning dismisses as unfortunate the vigour with which the nineteenth
centuryjudges protected freedom of property and freedom of contract and welcomes
the intervention of Parliament to force those who provide essential supplies and services
to provide adequate and efficient service at reasonable charges and to put on the state
the positive responsibility of seeing that everyone is provided with the necessities of life.
Review of Denning, Freedom, supra note 9 at 415. Willis expresses relief that 'here at last
was ajudge who was not prepared to follow the strict party line of Lord Hewart or Dr.
C.K. Allen....' Ibid. Willis may not have believed it, but arguably Denning's position was
indicative of the broader English judiciary in the post-war period.
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had argued was necessary to achieve both 'fair play for the individual and
efficiency of administration. ' 165 In other words, in the constitutional
settlement over judicial review that ultimately took hold in England, the
role of the courts was not to impede administrative power but to legitimize it. The courts served as a 'commitment mechanism' (again, to use
game-theoretical language) to ensure that the administrative state
observed certain basic norms of a constitutional nature, such as natural
justice, while also respecting the boundary between intraand ultra vires as
established by the enabling legislation itself.
There was also a specifically functional reason for the increase in
judicial controls in the post-war constitutional settlement: given the
growing regulatory and interventionist ambitions of the welfare state,
administrative agents who operated under the auspices of the executive
came to enjoy, as a consequence of organizational complexity (if not also
of formal legal right), a significant degree of effective independence.
This 'agency autonomy' undermined the effectiveness of hierarchical
political control by ministers or by Parliament - that is, the democratically legitimate 'principals' in the system - and thus created the need for
an alternative kind of commitment mechanism to ensure compliance
with the legislative and constitutional requirements. Judicial controls
served this functional purpose, even as the activities of the courts were
normally rationalized in terms of the protection of individual rights,
consistent with the constitutionalist ethos of the post-war period. Administrative litigation was a means by which Parliament could enlist judicial
power and private interests in the task of controlling the normative
autonomy of the executive and administrative sphere, and thereby
indirectly assert the legislature's own superior democratic legitimacy in
the construction of the welfare state.
Iv Conclusion:
Willis and the function ofjudicial review in the administrativestate
Willis's overheated critique of the McRuer Report in 1968 - exemplified
by his sarcastic suggestion that 'the Commission might just as well go the
whole hog and recommend that all the deciding authorities of whatever
nature be brought within the ordinary court system" 166 (something very
far from anything the Commission had actually recommended) - seems
to suggest an inability to move beyond the English battle lines of the
1920s and 1930s. Statements in 'Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect' in 1974 are to similar effect, particularly the derisive references to
'the parables sometimes drawn from the Stuart period by some twentieth165 Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries,supra note 148 at 2.
166 Willis, 'Lawyers' Values,' supra note 9 at 360.
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centuryjudges,' or to what Willis called the 'theology' of modern administrative law (but which 'the devotees thereof would certainly call "enduring values"'). Willis also tellingly laments the emergence of 'a number of
currently fashionable cults and the damage they may do to effective
government if they are allowed to infiltrate too deeply into the procedural part of administrative law.' 167 These include:
the cult of the 'individual' and claims by prisoners in penitentiaries, complaining
of their treatment there or applying for parole, to a formal 'right to be heard';
the cult of 'openness' and claims by the press to the right to dig into confidential
government files; the cult of 'participatory democracy' and claims by 'concerned'
busybodies to the right to be allowed to take court proceedings to curb, say,
alleged illegal pollution or alleged dereliction of duty by the police."
This is powerful, even inflammatory, language. It is also perhaps
misleading, however, as to the extent to which Willis's views represented
unreconstructed hostility to the then-current directions in administrativelaw doctrine. Other writings of Willis from the post-war decades suggest
that he, too, recognized that judicial review could serve an important
control function in the administrative state - only one significantly more
limited than what the administrative law 'theologians' normally deemed
advisable. For example, in his 1959 commentary on the implications of
the Franks Committee's report for Canadian law, Willis states that 'the
courts should never be deprived of their historic power to require
deciding authorities to approach the matter before them in a fairminded way and with a fair procedure,' calling this a 'quasi-constitutional
guarantee ... against the possibility of arbitrary action.' 169 He objected
only to review over questions of law, or, more particularly, statutory
interpretation, repeating his fears from the 1930s that when courts
'interpret' statutes, what they usually do is simply 'pour their views into ...
the vague statutory standard [that] the board was set up to administer
[and] thereby
dictate to the board what any layman will recognize as
170
policy.'
Unfortunately Willis does not elaborate on these arguments, but an
American would immediately recognize in them features of our system of
administrative law as it has evolved over the last three decades, notably
167 Willis, 'Retrospect,' supra note 9 at 229.
168 Ibid.
169 Willis, 'Canadian Implications,' supra note 9 at 54. However, David Dyzenhaus's
contribution to this volume suggests scepticism toward such stray statements in view of
the much more pervasive hostility to judicial review that one finds throughout Willis's
writings, which Dyzenhaus sees as evidence of Willis's fundamental rejection of the
'logic of the rule of law.' David Dyzenhaus, 'The logic of the rule of law: Lessons from
Willis' (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 691.
170 Willis, ibid. at 55; see also Willis, 'Administrator asJudge,' supra note 9 at 436.

RECONCILING WITH THE PAST

687

our judicially enforced guarantees of 'reasoned decisionmaking' under
the 'arbitrary and capricious' clause of the Administrative Procedure
Act,17' as well as judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations
under the Chevron doctrine. 1 72 The similar constraints advocated by Willis
were undoubtedly motivated by a desire to keep courts out of policy
making, but the American experience over the last several decades
suggests that even these constraints leave the courts ample room, under
the guise of legal control, to second-guess policy making in the administrative sphere.
Not only is this unsurprising, it well may reflect a deeper functional
truth: that legislatures would not so freely delegate normative power and popular opinion would not tolerate such broad delegations without this functional background constraint securely in place. One can
only imagine what Willis (who famously tried to 'talk law with a ...
political science accent"73 ) would make of more recent work in political
science that outlines a positive political theory ofjudicial review precisely
as a principal-agent control on delegated normative power. Rather than
deridingjudicial enforcement of transparency and participation rights as
'cults' to be opposed, this work recognizes that judicial enforcement of
such rights may serve as an indirect means by which national legislatures
monitor, the activities of their national executives and subordinate
bureaucratic officials. From a principal-agent perspective, judicially
enforceable transparency and participation rights in the administrative
sphere act as forms of 'fire-alarm oversight' - that is, as a legislative
harnessing of private interests and the courts in the broader project of
reducing the inevitable agency autonomy that flows from delegation.
Judicial review in this way operates in conjunction with hierarchical
political oversight - 'police patrols' - exercised by the democratically
legitimate political principals in the legislature or at the summit of the
executive (chief executives, cabinet secretaries, or their immediate
appointees) .174

Was Willis, who claimed to be a 'what actually happens man," 75 so
bound up in his own normative critique of seemingly retrograde, 'antibureaucratic' judicial attitudes left over from the inter-war period
(whether they belonged to Hewart or - purportedly - McRuer) that he
failed to see the potential for a functionalist defence of broad forms of
171
172
173
174

5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).
Chevron U.S.A. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Willis, 'Retrospect,' supra note 9 at 227
See Matthew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms' in Matthew McCubbins & Terry Sullivan, eds.,
Congress: Structure and Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 426 at
426-34.
175 Willis, 'Retrospect,' supra note 9 at 225.
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judicial review? I cannot say. What it does seem fair to say, however, is
that Willis, in his fixation on the battles of the 1930s, had a very limited
sense of the appropriate types of controls in the administrative state. In
Willis's estimation, the essential 'safeguards are not [provided by] the
courts but [by] question time in the House of Commons, an opposition
press, pressure groups and last, but not least, the good sense and decency
of the officials.' 176 In light of experiences like the Crichel Down Affair,
however, there was an understandable concern over an excessively autonomous bureaucratic apparatus, 77 as well as over the adequacy of hierarchical political controls, standing alone, to control that autonomy.
This functional explanation for the persistence of judicial review in
the administrative state, although in many respects persuasive, is incomplete, in my view. It is, rather, necessary to return to a point I stressed at
the beginning of this article: the impact of historical political culture and
its dialectical relationship to the functional adaptation of structures of
governance in the twentieth century.. To fully appreciate historical
change in the administrative state, one must appreciate how changing
structures of governance were 'experienced' in light of historically
rooted conceptions of legitimacy and, in turn, how that experience
motivated the evolution of administrative law- that is, its 'reconciliation'
with the past. Willis recognized, with frustration, that conceptions of legal
legitimacy inherited from the past could become social and political
realities 'by prescription, and so, alas, at present ineradicable." 8 But he
never fully accepted the implications of this insight. He saw such historical conceptions of legal legitimacy rooted in judicial review only as
'misunderstood' obstacles to the proper structural-functional evolution
of administrative structures. 179
In the end, then, maybe it was Willis who did not understand. What he
called the 'long-dead eighteenth-century past ' 18 was neither dead nor
even really past. A pure, 'functional' evolution in administrative structures without 'refraction' through a historically contingent cultural
'experience' was an impossibility.' 8 1 Indeed, Willis elsewhere states that

176 Willis, Review of Denning, Freedom, supra note 9 at 416.
177 This distrust is likely well placed, no matter how 'decent' the civil servants turn out to
be. Of particular relevance here are the insights of modern cognitive psychology on
decision-making biases in large-scale organizations. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Cynthia R. Farina, 'Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design' (2002) 87
Cornell L.Rev. 549.
178 Willis, Review ofJennings, Cabinet Government, supra note 9 at 581.
179 In calling for the creation of a special court of review of administrative action,
something that Willis believed was functionally necessary, he states, 'Nothing stands in
the way but a misunderstood concept.' 'Three Approaches,' supra note 5 at 81.
180 Willis, 'Retrospect,' supra note 9 at 245.
181 See Thompson, 'History and Anthropology,' supra note 28, and accompanying text.
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historical-cultural conceptions of legitimacy 'crystallize in vivid, even if
partially inaccurate, form the spirit of tried national institutions. 18 2 The
English effort to reconcile administrative governance and historical
conceptions of constitutional democracy and the rule of law in the postwar decades could not ultimately break from these 'tried national institutions' (not just Parliament but also the ordinary courts) because the
prevailing political culture would not permit it.
The reconciliation of the old and the new that Willis saw as problematic - the 'seeing [of] likeness in unlike things' 8 3 - became possible only
because English administrative law retained forms of control rooted not
just in Parliament and the government but also in the ordinary courts. In
this way, the post-war constitutional settlement in England preserved
some semblance of both parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. It
was this combination of political and judicial control mechanisms - this
'reconciliation' with the past - that made it possible for the English
people to experience the new structures of administrative governance as
'democratic' and 'constitutional' in a historically recognizable sense.

182 Willis, 'Three Approaches,' supra note 5 at 70.
183 Willis, Review ofJennings, Cabinet Government, supra note 9 at 581.
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